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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT ON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY*
LLAD PHILLIPS** AND HAROLD L. VOTEY, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
Economics has been referred to as "the dismal
science," an appellation which probably stems from
Thomas Malthus' 18th century essay on popula-
tion,1 in which he predicted dire consequences for
the world's people as a consequence of rapid rates
of population growth. While the immediate conclu-
sions from some of our research on the economics of
crime may seem to contribute to a dismal outlook,
we would prefer to argue that a problem is dismal
only if we cannot see a clear path to a solution and
thus run out of hope.
A recent headline in the Los Angeles Times2 read
"L.A. C-ime Rate Could Collapse Justice System,
Computer Says." Allowing for the tendency of the
press to attribute occult powers to computers, we
find that a research team from the University of
Southern California has predicted a possible col-
lapse of the system of criminal justice in Los An-
geles as a consequence of an overload on facilities
at all levels. However, from an examination of the
formal documentation of the work performed by
the USC group, it appears that their analysis was
based on a "simplistic" inertial model in which
crime generation and crime countermeasures were
treated as inertial forces. Although this very exten-
sive study has produced projections that will be
* The authors wish to acknowledge the support of the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, United States Department of Justice, under
whose auspices the original research for this paper was
conducted. Continuing research on these topics is pres-
ently being supported by the California Council on
Criminal Justice-Task Force on Science and Technol-
ogy Ph.D., Harvard University, 1969; Assistant Pro-
fessor of Economics, University of California, Santa
Barbara.
t Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1968;
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Barbara.
I The reference was "to respectable professors of the
dismal science." T. CAnL-sLE, LATIER DAY
PA I r=Ts, No. 1 (1850).
2 Drummond, L.A. Crime Rate Could Collapse Justice
System, Computer Says, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 13,
1970, § B, at 1, col. 4. This story was based upon
McEachern, el al., Criminal Justice Simulation Study:
Some Preliminary Projections, June 30, 1970 (Public
Systems Research Institute, U.S.C.).
invaluable in alerting policy-makers to the very
real consequences of allowing present trends to go
unchecked, it does little to provide an understand-
ing of how the criminal justice system will respond
to continuing rates of change. This is because sim-
plistic inertial models are not designed to analyze
underlying processes, and consequently do not
yield an understanding of how a system works, nor
do they provide clues to action necessary for con-
trolling the various forces within a system.
The dire predictions about the consequences of
continually rising crime rates raise a number of
questions. Where do we break into this system to
bring crime levels within reasonable limits? Are
there alternative approaches or solutions to the
problem? What will happen to law enforcement ef-
fectiveness and crime rates if we continue with
present expenditure policies? How much would it
cost to keep law enforcement effectiveness from de-
teriorating? Can we afford to hold constant or
reduce the current level of offenses?
In this study we have utilized the techniques of
economics for evaluating and controlling economic
systems in an analysis of crime control. Using the
most recently available data including that from
the Uniform Crime Reporting Section of the FBI
and the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics,
our study analyzes the processes generating crime,
the productivity of law enforcement agencies, and
welds these two processes together in a model that
permits an analysis of underlying causes and the
various appropriate responses to the crime problem.
ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
This study is based on a model which incorpo-
rates interaction between the process that generates
crime and the system of law enforcement. We
postulate that law enforcement not only responds
to crime for the purpose of meting out punishment,
but more importantly that it creates a deterrent
effect which tempers the process of crime genera-
tion. In this more sophisticated model, one of the
potential theoretical outcomes will still be the col-
lapse of the criminal justice system. More impor-
tant for our purposes, however, is the use of such a
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model to critically examine the processes of crime
generation and crime control.
Our study deals primarily with the major felon-
ies which may be classified as economic crimes:
crimes for which there is a clear-cut economic
motive. Many of the results, however, are more
general in nature and will apply to non-economic
crimes as well. Our analysis conveniently breaks
down into three parts. We will deal separately with
the process of crime generation and with the analy-
sis of law enforcement viewed as a service industry,
finally synthesizing these results to create an inter-
acting system. This system is illustrated sche-
matically in Figure 1. The logic of this schematic is
as follows: Law enforcement is viewed as acting on
offenses and clearing them by arrest. The effective-
ness of law enforcement is determined by technol-
ogy and expenditures on law enforcement. The ef-
fectiveness of law enforcement is, in turn, presumed
to affect the behavior-of offenders. In addition to
law enforcement, attitudes and economic condi-
tions are postulated to determine offense rates. The
inclusion of the impact of the judicial and correc-
tional systems on offense rates is illustrated by
broken lines to indicate that these systems have
not been analyzed in the present study, but could
readily be incorporated within this conceptual
framework.
In our empirical analysis of crime generation we
included larceny, burglary, auto theft, and robbery
as defined and reported in the Uniform Crime Re-
ports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our
study breaks the population down into subsets
classified by age, sex, and race. There are sound
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reasons for this. For example, the evidence shows
rather emphatically that these crimes are largely a
youthful phenomenon. We find that both the dis-
tribution of crimes by age and the rates of increase
of crimes by age are greater for the ages under
twenty. Consequently, we selected 18-19 year olds
as an appropriate group to study. We found further
that for these crimes, except for larceny, 94% or
more are committed by males in the 18-19 year old
group. For larceny the figure is 75%. We also ob-
served that arrest patterns vary by race for reasons
which became apparent as the study progressed.
Cnm= GENFaATION
For several centuries criminologists have been
suggesting economic motives as one of the possible
causes of property crimes. Illegal gains are an al-
ternative to income earned honestly. The critical
question is how does one choose between socially
acceptable and illegal alternatives for earning in-
come. Here economic theory can make an impor-
tant contribution. Theory tells us that a rational
individual will, implicitly at least, consider all of
the alternatives open to him in terms of a benefit-
cost analysis. From normal employment, the
benefit is a stream of wage payments. The associ-
ated costs include the every-day costs of acquiring
and maintaining a job. In the case of a crime, the
benefits are any returns from its commission. The
costs include the direct costs associated with the
actual commission of a crime; advance research,
transportation, the transactions' costs of disposing
of illegally obtained goods.' In addition, there may
be the costs associated with being apprehended, in-
cluding the cost of having an arrest on one's rec-
ord, the cost for legal defense, the loss of income
from being incarcerated, and the psychic cost of
being branded a criminal. The expected cost of
these latter possibilities will be the cost associated
with the event multiplied by the probability that
the event (arrest, trial, imprisonment) takes place.
When our rational individual considers this whole
array of possibilities he will quite naturally choose
that activity which yields him the greatest net ma-
terial and psychic benefits. Should some elements
of this choice set be eliminated for any reason, the
individual would, of course, choose from those al-
ternatives remaining.
The next step is to see how this theory of choice
relates to economic realities for the 18-19 year old
IThe benefit (value) the criminal receives from
illegal goods may be considerably less than the market
price.
group. What do we know about their set of alterna-
tives? If we look at the data for the period 1952
through 1967 (Fig. 2) we find that unemployment
rates for white males go from a low of 7.0% in 1952
to a high of 16.5% in 1958, then decline erratically
to 9.0% in 1967. Over the same period, unemploy-
ment rates for non-whites go from a low of 10.0%
in 1952 to a high of 27.2% in 1959, then decline to
20.1% in 1967. By contrast, average unemploy-
ment rates for the total labor force never rise above
6.8% over this entire period.
Another measure of the economic well-being of a
population subset is the group's labor force partici-
pation rate. This is a measure of the proportion of
the group who are either employed or actively seek-
ing work. A decline in participation rates for youths
generally comes about for one of two reasons. An
individual may be attending school, or he may be
so despondent about the possibility of obtaining
work that he leaves the labor force. Referring to
Fig. 3, we observe that in terms of their participa-
tion rates, 18-19 year olds are worse off than the
population as a whole, and non-whites are again
relatively disadvantaged.
The impact of school enrollment on this process
is also important. Going to school represents an in-
vestment in greater future earning power for the
individual. A rational individual will look at the
lifetime possibilities associated with greater school-
ing as compared to immediate full time employ-
ment. The array of opportunities facing an 18-19
year old thus has a time dimension and includes
schooling as one of the legal activities from which
he can choose. However, the choice of further edu-
cation may also depend on immediate employment
opportunities, since schooling requires an immedi-
ate investment for a return that may commence
years hence. Consequently, lacking either savings
or a job, the opportunity to attend school may be
eliminated from an individual's alternatives for
reasons beyond his control. Referring to Fig. 4,
which depicts statistics for school enrollment, we
find that in 1952, 38.1% of 18-19 year old white
males were enrolled in school. This may be con-
trasted with 34.6% for non-white males of the same
age. By 1967 these figures had risen to 61.5% and
53.5% respectively. Once more we see that non-
whites have become relatively disadvantaged.
To study the impact of economic opportunity for
youth on their criminal activity one can formulate
a probability model of behavior based on a popula-
tion breakdown by labor force characteristics.
Figure 5 is a Venn diagram of such a breakdown. It
[Vol. 63
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FIGURE 2.
MA= UNEMPLOYmENT RATES BY RACE, SELECTED AGE GROUPs
Source: Based on data from D=PT. or LABOR, MAxpOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, (1970).
is obvious that crimes committed by this age group
must involve individuals in one of the subsets of
the total 18-19 year old population. The shaded
area in the center represents those who have com-
mitted crimes in a given year. If we believe that
employment status and school enrollment status
affect the individual's inclination to commit a
crime, then we would expect the probability of ar-
rest to vary according to the subset of the popula-
tion in which an individual is found. As noted
above, we know that the number of individuals in
each of these categories varies over time and have
data on this variation. We also have data on how
arrest rates for 18-19 year olds vary over the same
period. If we use arrest rates as a measure of the
probability of arrest and the data on school enroll-
ment and labor force status to represent the proba-
bility of being in one of these population groups, we
can estimate the impact of changing school enroll-
ment and job opportunities on arrest rates. We find
that we can "explain" 98% of the variation in
arrest rates for 18 and 19 year olds by changes in
their economic opportunities.
4
This suggests that an improvement in economic
opportunities for youth in terms of some form of
education or immediate employment will have an
ameliorating effect on youthful crime rates. This in
itself is hardly a new idea. Although sociologists
have been asserting this for some time, the im-
portant thing here is that solid statistical verifica-
tion of this relationship is provided within a for-
mally specified analytical frameworkA
The policy implication from our result is that
4H. VoTEY & L. Pmm.LIps, EcoNOmC CarHis:
THEm GENERATION, DETERRENCE AND CONTROL 41,
23a, 27a (National Technical Information Service
P B 194 984, 1969).
5 For the development of our analytical framework
and a discussion of earlier studies by others, see Phillips,
Votey & Maxwell, Crine, Youth, and the Labor Market,
80 J. PoL. EcoN. 491 (1972).
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FIGuRE 3.
MALE LABOR FoRcE PARTICiPATmON RATES By RACE, S rxC=D AGE GRoups
Source: Based on data from DEPT. OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1970).
there is a trade-off between policies which control
crime and those which affect the generation of
crime. An important aspect of the latter policy is a
cumulative one. The evidence on recidivism is dis-
couraging. Once an individual commences on a
pathway of crime as the source of economic sus-
tenance, it is difficult to reroute him toward socially
acceptable earning activities for a number of
reasons. Thus, any measures which tend to remove
the incentive for crime generation may have both
an important immediate effect on crime rates and
a more important long-run effect on the level of
crime.
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRODUCTION FUNCTION
So far we have analyzed crime generation on the
assumption that the impact of law enforcement on
the process is constant. Since we cannot be sure
this is true it is equally important to analyze the
process of law enforcement from an economic point
of view. To an economist, a law enforcement agency
may be viewed in essentially the same manner as a
firm in a service industry. A firm will maximize
profits, given the prices it can charge for its services
and the cost of inputs. Similarly, a law enforcement
agency will maximize its output, given the annual
budget determined by some external public body.
[Vol.6






MALE ScHooL ENEoLENT RATIOS BY RACE
Source: Based on data from DEPT. oF COmmaECE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-20, selected issues.
To acquire a conceptual understanding of the
analysis of such an agency from an economic point
of view, refer to Fig. 6. The activity of the agency
(police department) may be regarded as a process
into which flows an array of reported offenses.
Police personnel operate on these offenses utilizing
their time and capital equipment consisting of
patrol cars, communication equipment, laborato-
ries, etc., and produce a list of crimes cleared by ar-
rest. For our analysis, we do not concern ourselves
with the disposition of those arrested, but only as-
sume the process works beyond the point of arrest.
The production function approach to law en-
forcement serves to emphasize a very important
point. If offense rates are increasing, expenditures
on law enforcement must be increased fast enough,
or police effectiveness will fall. The necessary rate
of increase in expenditures can be determined. If
the offense rate increases and there is no increase in
expenditures on law enforcement and no improve-
ment in law enforcement technology, offenses
cleared by arrest will increase but at a diminishing
rate, as police resources are stretched more thinly.
Beyond some point police will be unable to clear
further crimes without being allotted additional
resources. Consequently, police effectiveness as
measured by the clearance ratio (the ratio of of-
fenses cleared by arrest to offenses) will fall. (Refer
to Fig. 7.) Conversely, if the offense rate is not
changing and there are increases in expenditures or
U Iff
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a. Labor Force Model
IP - Institutional Population
AS - Armed Services
E = Employed
U = Unemployed
NLF = Not in the Labor Force
S - Enrolled in School
D = Not Enrolled in School
b. Labor Force - School Enrollment Model
FIGURE 5.
VENN DIAGRAms OF POPULATION CATEGORIES USED IN MODELS OF CRIME GENERATION
The ratio of shaded area to total area, which may be measured by age, specific arrest rates for any given age
population, represents the probability of arrest.
Persons
improvements in technology, police effectiveness
will increase. If both offense rates and expenditures
are increasing, the nature of the relationship be-
tween inputs and outputs will determine the impact
on police effectiveness.
The important thing is that it is possible to esti-
mate statistically the parameters of this production
relationship. Based on national experience we can
determine what percentage of increase in clearances
one might expect with a one-percent increase in
police manpower or from a one-percent increase in
capital equipment. This information is of impor-
tancein making general estimates of how to allocate
resources for the control of a particular crime, given
that we wish to obtain a particular outcome in
terms of the level of clearances for that crime.
These "elasticities," i.e., percentage changes in
output for a given one-percent change in one of the
inputs, are shown in Table I.
One would expect a relatively larger coefficient
on Other Expenditures on Law Enforcement for
crimes which require a more intensive use of capital
in their solution. The crimes which we find to be
more capital intensive by this reasoning are robbery
and auto theft. These results seem to be consistent
with a casual inspection of law enforcement experi-
ence. Robbery appears to be a crime whose solution
depends upon a high degree of mobility of the
(Vol. 63
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police force and on communications since typical
robberies are committed in areas in which con-
tinued surveillance is virtually impossible. Clear-
ances for auto theft also seem to depend upon the
mobility of the police force and more recently on
computerized tracing techniques, all highly capital
intensive. Thus it should not be surprising that
Other Expenditures appears more important in
these estimated relationships. On the other hand,
burglary solutions seem to depend more upon
analytical techniques of a detective force and upon
surveillance. Here we find that Police Personnel is
a more important input in terms of the relative
size of the coefficients. The solution of larceny
(theft) depends almost entirely on surveillance and
once more the variable Police Personnel is rela-
tively more important than Other Expenditures on
Law Enforcement.
The policy implications of these results are illus-
trated for the case of robbery in Fig. 8. The solid
line represents the actual experience of police in
clearing crimes over the period studied. Over this
is superimposed the predicted values based on our
production function.
Our estimated production function fits the actual
experience quite well. We see that whereas expendi-
tures forlaw enforcement (policepersonnel and other
expenditures on law enforcement) were rising fairly
steadily over the entire period, offenses, which re-
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much more rapidly from that year on. The conse-
quence of this was that police effectiveness deteri-
orated rapidly in the latter period following a
moderate rise from 1952-1957. If there had been a
properly balanced increase in police personnel and
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TABLE I
EmcnvENlss OF INPUTS INTO THE
LAW ENZoRcEC ENT SYSTEM
Percentage Change in the Crimes




Offenses Police ExpendituresPersonnel on Law
Enforcement
Larceny ......... .628 :405 .143
Burglary ......... .186 .722 .303
Auto Theft ....... .546 * .287
Robbery ......... .529 * .131
* Police personnel did not have a statistically
significant impact on crimes cleared by arrest for auto
theft and robbery.
Source: Votey & Phillips, Poice Effectiveness: The
Law Enforcement Production Function, 1 J. LEGAL
STIm s 423 (1972).
onward to offset the rise in offenses, law enforce-
ment agencies would have been able to maintain
the level of police effectiveness.
SIMULTANEOUS SYSTEM O CRDE
GENERATION AND CONTROL
At this point, We have two relationships which
comprise a simplified model of crime generation and
control. Referring to Fig. 1, we recall that deter-
rence is the link between crime control and crime
generation. Fig. 9 shows clearance ratios for the
index crimes from 1952 to 1967 for the cities cov-
ered by the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI.
The clearance ratio is both an index of police ef-
fectiveness in apprehending criminals and a meas-
ure of the probability of a criminal being arrested
for a single offense. This probability should enter
the potential criminal's cost calculations when he is
choosing between economic alternatives. As the
clearance ratio falls with no change in other varia-
CLEARANCE RATIO
PREDICTED CLEARANCE RATIO
------ TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFENSES
1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 '1962 1964 1966 1968
YEAR
FIGURE 8.
Tnz Tno PATERx or (The logarithms of) T CEAR.NcE RA7io, PREDCTED CLEARANCE RATIO,
TOTAL EXPENDrrURES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND OPENSES
Sources: Data from the Uniform Crime Reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and DEPT. o COmmERCE,
GovERNmNTAL FINANCE, selected issues.
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bles in the system we would expect more criminal
activity since the probability of arrest has fallen.
This is in fact what we have observed. Figure 10
shows the alarming rise in offenses over the same
time period.
The interaction of rising offenses with an insuffi-
dent rise in expenditures for law enforcement
has resulted in the clearance ratio tracing a pat-
tern resembling an inverted U as illustrated in Figs.
8 and 9. The two relationships we have derived are
illustrated in Fig. 1la in such a manner as to reveal
the interaction between them. The clearance ratio
is plotted on the vertical axis. If law enforcement
activity were completely successful the clearance
ratio would be 1.0, i.e., clearances would equal of-
fenses. The lower limit to the ratio is zero. For a
given level of police technology and law enforce-
ment expenditures, we would expect the clearance
ratio to fall as offenses rise. Law enforcement per-
sonnel will be spread thinner and thinner in terms
of the job they face, until only a small proportion



















1952 1956 1960 1964 1968
YEAR
FIGURE 10.
OnsNsE RATEs rO TBE FBI INDEX CRmi3s
Source: Based on data from Uniform Crime Reports,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- N -ROBBERY is illustrated by the solid line. Simultaneously, we
- must consider the crime generation function, which
AU9TE" indicates how the offense rate will vary with the
probability of arrest, given a particular state of af-
2fairs as determined by economic opportunities and
LARCENY social attitudes. That relationship is illustrated by
the broken line. The two relationships will lead to
an equilibrium solution with all forces in balance
at point A. If the relationship is as we have drawn
it, we will have a stable equilibrium.
Note that Fig. 11a illustrates the determination
1 1 95 I I of the clearance ratio and the offense rate (point A)
YEAR for a given level of expenditures and state of tech-
FIGURE 9. nology for law enforcement and a given state of
racm EmcrrvNss rop Tn 7 FBI INDmx CRmzs economic conditions for crime generation. As law
L. PHILLIPS AND H. L. VOTEY
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enforcement expenditures rise or the state of tech-
nology improves, the crime-control curve will ro-
tate upward and to the right. (The endpoint on the
vertical axis representing a clearance ratio of one
will remain fixed.) As economic conditions or social
attitudes worsen the crime generation function will
also tend to rotate in this same manner. If economic
conditions worsen or social attitudes deteriorate,
expenditures will have to increase in order to main-
tain the effectiveness of law enforcement. However,
even in this case the offense rate will rise. If the
equilibrium had been at some point C to the right
of A and there had been a change in socio-economic
conditions (e.g., a decline in unemployment rates)
to shift the crime generation function such that the
new equilibrium would be at A, we would find that
the level of the clearance ratio, as indicated by C
on the crime control function, produces a greater
probability of arrest than that anticipated by
criminals. In successive moves a lower level of
offenses will prevail until we reach the equilibrium
point of A. Should offenses have been below A, a





we would find a lower clearance ratio than antici-
pated and crimes would rise until the system is once
more in balance. This stable equilibrium represents
the situation which we believe prevails in the
United States at this time.
An example is the case of auto theft,6 in which
we note that the equilibrium is stable. A decline
of 0.75 percent in the clearance ratio will induce a
one-percent increase in the offense rate, which in
turn only causes a decline of 0.66 percent in the
clearance ratio. Thus we see that changes precipi-
tated by shifts in crime generation (or shifts in
crime control caused by changes in law enforce-
ment expenditures) will damp out and for auto
theft the system will approach a point like A.
Consequently, the system remains subject to
control.
Using the results of simultaneously estimated
6 It should not be surprising that auto theft, which of
the seven major felonies had one of the lowest average
clearance ratios (26%) over the period 1952-1967, had
one of the highest average offense rates (264 auto thefts
per 100,000 population), suggesting that a low level of
deterrence is directly linked to a high level of offenses.
[Vol. 63
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relationships such as those we estimated independ-
ently for the crime generation function and law
enforcement production function, it is possible to
calculate some of the alternative rates of change
for the clearance ratio and offense rates for auto
theft which would have been possible to achieve
by varying law enforcement expenditures.7 These
are presented in Table II. We observe that during
this period the per capita offense rate for auto theft
was growing at 6.1% per year, and the rate of
offenses cleared by arrest per capita was growing
at 4.8% per year. Consequently, the clearance
ratio was falling at the average rate of 1.3% per
year. Implementation of the estimated relation-
ships yields the results that per capita expenditures
on law enforcement should have increased at the
rate of 3.6% per year to keep the clearance ratio
from falling. In fact, law enforcement expenditures
were growing at only 2.9% per year. Even if
expenditures on law enforcement had grown at
3.6% per year, the per capita offense rate for auto'
theft would have risen at 4.5% per year. It would
have been necessary to increase per capita ex-
penditures on law enforcement at the rate of 5.4%
per year to maintain the auto theft offense rate at
a constant level during this period. Referring to
Table II we see that if there had been no decrease
in law enforcement effectiveness (0% rate of
growth of the clearance ratio) offenses would have
grown by 4.5% compared to the actual rate of
increase of 6.1%. We conclude that approximately
75% of the observed rise in offense rates is attribut-
able to changes in crime generation forces and only
25% to the failure to maintain law enforcement
effectiveness.
The finding of stability over this period gives
no grounds for complacency, however, for we can
envision another altogether different situation. It
7 The estimated functional relationships are:
InCRt = Ink + Xt + (a - 1)nOt + elnEt
nOt = Inj + Ot + -nCRt + aln(pp)t,
where CR, 0, t, and pp are defined as the clearance ratio#
offense rate, time, and the product of the umemployment
rate and participation rate, respectively. Time is in-
cluded in the crime control function to measure changes
in productivity due to technological change and in the
crime generation function to measure systematic
changes in social attitudes. The estimates for auto theft
are:
a X 0
0.339 0.222 -1.330 -0.193 0.022 0.045
A detailed explanation of the calculations for Table II
can be found m Votey & Phillips, supra note 4, App. C,
at 5.
TABLE II
PossIBLE CHANGES IN ANNUAL MzAsunEs roR AUTO
THErT GivN Cmn GENERAION FoRCES AND
ALTERNATIVE RATEs or GRoWTH or EXPENDITmES
ON LAW ENEORcEm NT
Expenditures o Consequent Changes Resultant Increase




is conceivable that police effectiveness could fall
so low that we approach another equilibrium point
as shown at B. Here we have an unstable equilib-
rium such that a shock to the system moving us
in either direction from B will find no correcting
force to bring about a return.
Should the law enforcement production function
shift upward from LEPF to LEPF', as illustrated
in Fig. 11c, as a consequence of a rise in expendi-
tures on law enforcement, starting from B we
would find an increased probability of arrest lead-
ing to a decrease in offenses. We would reach a
new stable equilibrium at A'.
Suppose, however, that instead unemployment
rates increase so that the crime generation function
shifts from CGF to CGF' as illustrated in Fig.
Ilb. In this case the clearance ratio (and the prob-
ability of arrest expected by criminals) will be
lower than anticipated and crimes will increase
unchecked with the system out of control. This
is the analogue in the sophisticated model to the
collapse predicted by the simplistic inertial model.
There is another dynamic and presently un-
evaluated aspect of this system. It is conceivable
that there may be an indirect and possibly inverse
relationship between expenditures on law enforce-
ment and the shape of the crime generation func-
tion. A heavy emphasis on law enforcement to
the neglect of economic conditions could have the
effect of worsening social attitudes in the form of
a resentment of law enforcement and a general
attitude of antagonism between levels of society.
SUMmy
The value of the sophisticated model is that
the outcome results from a number of plausible
causes. Policy makers at one level may simply
not be providing sufficient resources to combat
19721
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crime, while policy makers at another level may
not be taking sufficient action to maintain eco-
nomic opportunities for an important segment
of the population. In addition, social attitudes
may be changing as a consequence of what leaders
on all levels do or fail to do in attempting to cope
with serious social problems. The solution to the
problem is largely one of society's being willing
to pay both the costs of law and order and the
costs of maintaining healthy economic conditions
and social attitudes. In the past we simply have
not kept abreast of the problem.
What then is the appropriate policy for the
nation or the state to follow to control crime? It
is clear to us that law enforcement should be bol-
stered substantially. We are also convinced that
such measures alone may be insufficient. We must
control crime generation for two reasons. First,
this is the only way to guarantee that we have
control of both processes and thus can maintain
social stability and, second, because the social
cost of crime through recidivism is certain to be
lower if we remove the incentives for the first
offense. Our model serves to emphasize a point
made by ex-Attorney General of the United States,
Ramsey Clark, who said, "Law enforcement can
only deal with the symptoms of crime. It's like
bailing out the basement without turning off the
water." We are in favor both of turning off the
water and bailing out the basement.
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